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I basically agree with Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett’s conclusion that 
“China’s market reforms have led not to socialist renewals but rather to full-fledged 
capitalist restoration, including growing foreign economic domination” (p. 9).  I also 
agree that China’s road to capitalism has more to do with the reform dynamics than 
simple greed of the elite. Other conclusions that are hard to be refuted include: 
reforms have led to higher unemployment in the urban sector, economic and social 
inequality, political instability (the 1989 Tiananmen protests are of course the most 
vivid example, as discussed by the two authors), the worsening of women’s position 
in Chinese society in terms of work, social status and security, the worsening of 
working conditions in factories and workshops. For millions of Chinese what the 
reforms have brought to them is the loss of social safety net in pensions, housing, 
health care and education. The two authors probably also get the right diagnosis that 
China’s economy has become more imbalanced and prone to crisis.  
 
Other conclusions have to be treated more cautiously. The main one that I find most 
problematic is that proposition that “the foreign-driven rise of China as an export 
powerhouse will only intensify economic tensions and contradictions throughout the 
region, to the detriment of workers everywhere”. It is not conclusive, not yet at least, 
that China’s rise is “threatening to the ASEAn-4, which includes Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore”. There are mixed evidence, as the authors admit. Indeed 
China’s economic growth has helped the growth of Taiwan and Japan to start with. 
Now, whether growth is a good thing is another matter. The authors seem to argue, in 
the case of China any way, that growth by and in itself is not good for the majority of 
the people. If that is the case why the same kind of growth or non-growth in countries 
other than China should be considered as threatening problem? Non-growth of this 
kind that would “intensify economic tensions and contradictions throughout the 
region” should be celebrated by a socialist. Tensions and contradictions would expose 
the structural problems of the capitalist system and changes will therefore take place. 
Is not that what a socialist wants? 
 
I tend to think a lot of the rhetoric of the China threat from the U.S.A. is “cry wolf” of 
the Cold War legacy. I would even speculate that it might have something to do with 
the Yellow Peril fear. I am well aware the two authors certainly don’t belong to this 
category and they indeed issue a note of caution of not joining the China bashing 
game. What is important though is that if the socialists want to break the capitalist 
impasse new conceptualization and now assumptions are required. Let me start with 
some rhetoric question along this direction. If it is the indeed case, a case that is far 
from being proven, that the export-orientated growth in China has threatened the job 
situations in countries like the U.S.A., what is the problem for a socialist? Should not 
the workers in the developed countries give up some jobs some of the time so that the 
workers in poor countries can earn a living? Is it not more logical for a socialist to 
blame the states of these developed countries such as Singapore, Japan and U.S.A. 
who should look after the unemployed workers instead of blaming the Chinese or the 
Chinese state, or the Chinese system? Is it not a good development that “The range of 
products (and employment opportunities) in which Japan has a competitive advantage 
over China is rapidly narrowing” (p. 97)? Why should Japan, or the U.S.A., or indeed 
Europe, have the moral certification that it has to dominate the world in everything? 
Why should it be taken for granted that the developed countries must keep developing, 
their living standard must keep rising and their consumption must keep expanding? 
Have they not used enough of the world’s resources and possessed enough the 
world’s wealth already? One might rebut me by reminding me of the class line and by 
arguing that the wealth in the Western affluent countries is not in the hands of the 
labouring people but in the minority rich. This is true, but only in a very quantified 
sense. The workers do enjoy the benefit of their country being rich. Otherwise, why 
would a Chinese, even a middle class professional, want to migrate to the U.S.A to 
wash dishes? Why would the average salary of a worker in the U.S.A. and Japan forty 
times higher than that in China?  If the state and the ruling classes in these countries 
do not look after the unemployed should not a socialist encourage the workers to rise 
in protest so that the wealth in the country can be distributed more equally? Is that not 
what a socialist wants?  
 
Let us be a bit more philosophical so as to drag ourselves out of some comfortable 
assumptions. Why should employment in the development countries be such sacred 
cow that both the right wing politicians and left and progressive activists work hard or 
pretend to work hard to protect? Why should the workers be told that it is a universal 
truth that they should not lose their jobs? Is it not the ultimate idea of Marxism that 
we should not be chained to work for the sake of earning a living? There is enough 
material wealth to have a good life without having to work like slaves in the Western 
affluent societies. Why cannot we work less, say half a day for five days a week? 
Instead of bashing China, why cannot the U.S.A. labour people share work among 
themselves and struggle to have more welfare to cover the underclass?  
 
I therefore have problem with the statement “To endorse China’s economic growth 
success, in particular, is to endorse a development model that pits Chinese workers 
against workers in other countries in a competitive race to the bottom that has nothing 
to do with any progressive development of productive forces holistically considered” 
(p.112).  What is “the progressive development of productive forces” that the authors 
are talking about? I assume they do not mean the existing capitalist productive forces, 
But then a large chunk of their criticism of the development in China is based on its 
detrimental effect on the existing “productive forces” in the U.S.A., Japan, and the 
rest of Asia. In fact, the Chinese cheap labour has increased purchasing power of the 
U.S.A. consumers and they live a better life in terms of material consumption at the 
expense of the Chinese workers. Chinese workers work like slaves, Chinese 
environment is getting worse and worse and Chinese society is getting tenser and 
tenser while having solved the internal contradictions in the U.S.A. According to one 
estimate the Chinese cheap labour saved the U.S.A. consumers US$600 billion in the 
last ten years (Bo Xilai, Beijing qingnian bao, 14th May 2005, and quoted in shiji 
xuetang, http://www.ccforum.org.cn/view thread.php?tid=10416&extra=page%3D2, 
accessed on the 23rd May 2005..  
 
The trouble for the traditional style of socialist movement today is that for most 
working class people, “holistically” speaking they only care now and me, because 
they seem to realise that “in the long term we will all be dead”. Workers all over 
world have never united and will probably never do. Colonial historical evidence 
shows that in the U.S.A., Canada, New Zealand and Australia, workers and labourers 
were among the fiercest against the poor Chinese migrants. Take the example of 
Australia during the 19th century. It was the workers and trade union activists who 
were the most aggressive against the Chinese settlers on the ground that the Chinese 
coolies’ willingness to work on lower wages was a main obstacle to the creation of an 
equal society. This ideology fit well with the then prevalent social Darwinism and the 
Yellow Peril paranoid. Thus the first act of Australian federation in 1901, the first 
nation-building act of the first parliament, was an immigration exclusion act against 
the coloured races. This act, in the name of democracy and equality (Everyone is 
equal but some are more equal than others) pushed forward the White Australian 
policy that was in full force until the 1960s. 
 
In case there is a misunderstanding let me state categorically that I have no problems 
with the authors’ criticisms of the Chinese development and its growth model. My 
main concern is that we may be barking up the wrong tree. The development in China 
and its growth model has to be examined within the international context of the 
Western dominance of material wealth and life style. For one and an half centuries, 
the Chinese have been seeking the secret of making China as wealthy as a Western 
country and living a life style as a Westerner. They tried democracies (though only 
briefly), and they tried what they understood as socialism (for 30 years). Now they are 
tyring the East Asian—Japan, (South) Korea and Taiwan (the JKT)—model.  
 
To summarise and to abstract my response to the two authors’ valuable work I have 
two interrelated problems. The first problem is how to assess the era of Mao and this 
is related to the argument that the authors “took the problems of Chinese socialism 
before 1978 too lightly” as one contributor says, but did not expand on. Anyone who 
wants to be critical of the present Chinese system has to address two issues. The first 
is how to respond to the empirical evidence that political movements in the era of 
Mao were cruel and brutal and there was too much personal cost on the one hand and 
on the other that there was too much an economic scarcity and that environment was 
no less sacrificed than in a capitalist society. The second issue is theoretically and it is 
this: The Chinese liberals have been arguing that the era of Mao was not socialist but 
feudalist, dictatorial. It was not even Marxist because Marxism embraces 
enlightenment and humanism. Indeed, the Chinse authorities use what they consider 
orthodox Marxism to justify their restoration of capitalism: We cannot jump in 
History and China has to go through the stage of capitalism (which is more advanced 
and civilized than feudalism) before it moves to socialism. 
 
My second problem is how to assess market capitalism. Is it not the case that market 
capitalism has brought improvement of living standards to the majority of people, not 
just the elite or the rich, in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea (in contrast 
to North Korea)? Is it not the case that while it is true, as editors say in the ‘foreword’ 
that in China “the result is a very rich upper stratum and a comfortable middle class, 
and as for the rest: poverty, insecurity, unemployment, and a decline in education and 
medical care”, the majority of the people including the rural residents are better fed 
and better clothed in post-Mao China? We cannot skip the issue. If we do we will not 
be taken seriously and will be accused of being a member of the chattering class in an 
affluent society enjoying comfortable life while patronizing the Chinese who had 
actually experienced life in the era of Mao. 
 
Therefore, to engage a constructive discourse for alternative model of development 
we not only have to deal with the issue of “there is no alternative” (TINA) but also the 
issue of “there is no need for an alternative” (TINNFA). To deal the TINA issue we 
have to show not only there was rapid growth  (and good growth) in the era of Mao, 
but also show that the cost and failure in Mao period were not as great as they have 
been presented in the mainstream literature. On top of that we have to show that there 
was much that could have done better in socialist China. To deal with the TINNFA 
issue we have to show that the workers in market capitalist economies are angry with 
their own systems and that structural problems of market capitalism in affluent 
Western societies are insurmountable.  
